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ABSTRACT 
Dwight Waldo wrote nearly fifty years ago that democracy is 
very much more than the political context in which public 
administration is carried out. Public administration is now less 
hierarchical and insular and is increasingly networked. This has 
important implications for democracy, including changing 
responsibilities for the public interest, for meeting public 
preferences, and for the enhancement of political deliberation, 
civility, and trust. Networked public administration can pose a 
threat to democratic governance and it can open possibilities for 
strengthening overnance, depending on the values and actions of 
public administrators. 
[B]oth private and public administration were in an important 
and far-reaching sense false to the ideal of democracy. They 
were false by reason of their insistence that democracy, however 
good and desirable, is nevertheless something peripheral to 
administration. 
I have made no distinction . . . between "democracy" within 
an administrative system and "democracy" with respect to an 
administrative system's external relations. 
If administration is indeed "the core of modern government," 
then a theory of democracy in the twentieth century must 
embrace administration. 
The focus of this essay . . . is not upon the present and existing, 
but upon the future and potential. It seeks to discern where the 
frontier may be tomorrow and how we can move toward it. 
Dwight Waldo (1952, 87, 89 n. 13, 81, 83) 
In a prescient essay written almost a half-century ago, 
Dwight Waldo called attention to emerging ideas regarding 
democracy and administration. He noted the insufficiency of 
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treating democracy merely as part of the political context for a 
hierarchical administration. In so doing, Waldo anticipated the 
emergence of crucial themes and controversies that continue to 
challenge those who seek to craft an administrative state that 
comports with the ideals of democratic governance. 
The themes emphasized by Waldo, then and since, have had 
notable impact on public administration; the view of democracy 
as largely extraneous to administration seems now strikingly 
anachronistic. Instead, it would appear, the main issue facing 
students of democracy and bureaucracy near the dawn of the 
twenty-first century is how, not whether, democratic ideals can 
be woven more tightly into the fabric of administration. 
True enough, echoes of the original orthodoxy still can be 
heard. In his polemic, for instance, Theodore Lowi seeks a 
rehabilitation of centralized choice by emphasizing the likelihood 
of parochialism, inconsistency, and injustice when policy is 
"dealt out in shares" (to borrow Woodrow Wilson's phrase) to 
the self-serving alliances of administrative units, legislative com- 
mittees, and advantaged groups populating the interest-group 
liberal regime (1979). Such arguments can serve as reminders of 
real problems but have not diminished the broad contemporary 
interest in entwining democracy and administration more 
thoroughly. 
In fact, some version of democracy in administration seems 
to have triumphed as the new conventional wisdom, despite the 
complications involved, and few would endorse the old injunc- 
tion, challenged by Waldo at midcentury, that autocracy during 
working hours is the price paid for democracy after hours. 
Still, practice has a way of outstripping even such a con- 
sensus. As efforts have been made to open up the workings of 
bureaucracy to some democratic principles, the institutional form 
for public administration itself has altered significantly over time. 
Bureaucratic agencies surely continue to populate the landscape 
of government and will continue to provide the institutional core 
for governmental effort far into the future. But a focus on 
bureaucratic structures alone belies consequential developments in 
the realm of public administration, changes that carry implica- 
tions for applying democratic ideals to the practicing world of 
administration. The reality of much contemporary public adminis- 
tration is that a great number of the responsibilities that admin- 
istrators have, and a large portion of the programs they seek to 
energize, require operating in and through networks of actors and 
organizations, rather than individual units-what Hjern and 
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Porter (1981) call the "lonely organizations"-that have served 
heretofore as the primary focus of analytical attention. 
Increasingly, a crucial institutional arrangement for the 
successful operation of government in action is some version of 
the network (especially networked organizational units), rather 
than the hierarchy in isolation. This shift is important in many 
respects, not the least of which are the challenges and oppor- 
tunities implied for democratic governance. 
The assertion itself may be somewhat controversial (but see 
O'Toole forthcoming). The argument is, nonetheless, that many 
though not all public administrators currently must mobilize and 
coordinate people and resources across organizational structures 
as well as within them; that typically they do not have the formal 
wherewithal to compel compliance with such cooperative under- 
takings; that these networked settings may involve a variety of 
complicated links; and that this state of affairs is likely to persist 
and even increase in the future. 
This sketch requires at least modest elaboration, a task 
undertaken in the following section. The point of particular 
emphasis in this article, nevertheless, is a normative one: If the 
administrative world is increasingly a networked terrain, this 
development must be taken into account in any thoroughgoing 
and serious effort to unite democracy and administration. The 
main part of the subsequent analysis, therefore, raises some 
questions and implications for democratic theory in the net- 
worked context of public administration. 
FROM MONOCRATIC BUREAUCRACY 
TOWARD NETWORKS? 
Bureaucratic structures increasingly operate through linked 
arrays-networks-that comprise the broader institutional context 
for administrative action. The networked context, in turn, carries 
implications for the practical tasks of administrators, and it forces 
a reconsideration of some central questions of democracy and 
administration. 
Networks are structures of interdependence involving 
multiple organizations. They exhibit some structural stability and 
include, but extend beyond, formal linkages alone. The term is 
meant to capture a broad range of structural types. And the insti- 
tutional "glue" congealing networked ties may include authority 
bonds, exchange relations, and common-interest based coalitions. 
In networks, the reach of administration is expanded, but admin- 
istrators cannot be expected to exercise decisive leverage by 
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virtue of their formal position (O'Toole forthcoming). In more 
concrete terms, networks include interagency cooperative ven- 
tures; intergovernmental program management structures; com- 
plex contracting arrays; and public-private partnerships. They 
also include service-delivery systems reliant on clusters of 
providers that may include public agencies, business firms, not- 
for-profits, or even volunteer-staffed units, all linked by 
interdependence and some shared program interests. Rare is the 
policy sector, governmental unit, or administrative office that is 
not affected by the interweaving of structure and routine extend- 
ing well beyond the single agency. 
Analysts who use greatly differing theoretical perspectives 
have converged on the importance of networks for administra- 
tion. The breadth of available lenses is suggested by the mere 
mention of public choice and institutional rational choice, 
transaction costs and new institutional economics, sociologically 
based interorganizational theory, policy implementation, and 
intergovernmental management. A large proportion of public pro- 
grams operate in and through networked constellations, and the 
challenges of administration in a networked world are consider- 
able (see Kettl 1993; Milward 1996; for an early analysis of 
some of the issues, see Mosher 1980). Studies in a variety of 
national contexts echo the prominent network theme (examples 
include Hufen and Ringeling 1990; Hull with Hjern 1987; and 
Scharpf 1993). The increasing importance of international agree- 
ments entailing continuing program responsibilities uggests a 
broad range of important networking demands for public adminis- 
trators around the globe (see, for instance, Hanf 1994). 
Furthermore, it would seem that today's administrators 
inhabit an increasingly networked world. It is difficult to defend 
this assertion convincingly, since demonstrating its accuracy 
would require data that are not available. No descriptive informa- 
tion on the extent to which administrators operate interorgani- 
zationally has been collected; neither has systematic data on the 
proportion of public programs managed in multiactor settings 
rather than within sole agencies, nor even evidence on shifts over 
time. It is possible to show, nonetheless, that the current degree 
of "networkedness" is quite large, and that both technical and 
political forces appear to be at work to encourage further cross- 
organizational ties (O'Toole forthcoming). Some evidence even 
suggests, ironically, that efforts from political levels to trim the 
scale of bureaucracy and extent of direct administrative responsi- 
bility for accomplishing public purposes-privatizing functions, 
capping budgets, freezing or reducing staffing levels-accentuate 
the networking impulse. For the administrators who seek to 
achieve policy goals while they respect the limitations entailed in 
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the liberal order, networking impulses are even greater. Even 
within bureaucracies, evidence suggests a diffusing of the stan- 
dard chains of command into ever more complex, crosscutting 
patterns (Light 1995). 
Network contexts differ from conventional bureaucratic net- 
works. On this issue, it is first useful to acknowledge the 
continuing importance of bureaucratic structure. Public adminis- 
trators operate often within the hierarchy rather than laterally 
across nodes of a network structure, so the considerable knowl- 
edge of administration as developed in more standard accounts 
continues to apply. If the network thesis is accurate, nevertheless, 
additional implications follow. 
In particular, administration aimed at inducing cooperative 
effort across organizations requires that strategies and tactics be 
adapted to the realities of limited formal authority, at least along 
network lines. Administrators are likely to have to turn to a set 
of more subtle but no less important options, which rely on dip- 
lomatic skills; negotiating experience; and exhortative, percep- 
tual, informational, and leadership tools. When they organize 
public programs in network settings, public administrators can try 
to inspire participants toward a common purpose, facilitate 
exchange and a shared sense of obligation, maintain commitment 
through the use of information, and sometimes alter the network 
membership to encourage cooperative effort (see O'Toole 1996). 
A further implication, more directly relevant for present 
purposes, is that considering public administration in a networked 
world shifts the assumptions that ground much normative dis- 
course about proper administration. Normative issues involve 
questions of ethics and issues of political theory. As Dwight 
Waldo has emphasized, ethics may sometimes point in one direc- 
tion, while concerns rooted in political obligation may suggest 
another (Waldo 1974). In the remainder of this article, I will 
direct attention toward questions of political choice, examining 
some implications for democratic governance of the increasingly 
prominent network settings inhabited by public administrators. 
NETWORKED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
At the end of this century, the overriding standard-virtually 
worldwide -is a commitment o democracy as political ideal. 
Surely, as Waldo observed, this theme has permeated American 
culture, discourse, and political action (1952). While Waldo has 
noted the broad meaning of democratic ideals in the United 
States, he also has emphasized the complications entailed by the 
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juxtaposition of American democratic themes, based significantly 
on ancient Greek political ideas, with administrative practices and 
institutions that are largely Roman (1982). It is clear, therefore, 
that the treatment of the democratic principle cannot be limited to 
a simple unidimensional value or to formal institutions of govern- 
ance. 
In the present context, the analysis of democratic govern- 
ance can be considered in terms of three important values that 
constitute part of the meaning of democracy in contemporary 
times: responsibility for effecting the public interest; respon- 
siveness to public preferences; and enhancement of political 
deliberation, civility, and trust. 
The role of administration in fostering-or impeding-such 
political norms has been a long-standing theme in the field. The 
standard contextual assumption, however, has been bureaucracy. 
And normative arguments-for enhanced citizen involvement, 
more internally democratic units, more market-like arrangements, 
greater support for social equity, and so forth-have tended to 
use the standard bureaucratic structure as the assumed starting 
point for analysis. But what if the institutional context for public 
administration is increasingly not the "lonely organization" or the 
simple bureaucratic structure? What if administrators inhabit hier- 
archically established positions enmeshed within interorganiza- 
tional networks? 
Only a few preliminary efforts have been made thus far to 
sketch some implications for the political system of a more 
networked administrative world. Recent analyses in the new 
edition of the Handbook of Public Administration (Perry 1996), 
for instance, treat the themes of accountability and responsiveness 
almost exclusively in terms of administrators inhabiting individual 
organizations. However, Romzek (1996) offers a thoughtful 
assessment of the relationship between hierarchical and profes- 
sional accountability channels, and Cooper (1996) notes the 
increasingly enmeshed character of administrative responsibilities 
from such sources as international agreements and contractual 
ties. 
For literature more directly on point, only a few key 
references can be mentioned. In an important analysis, Mosher 
noted some complications in effectuating democratic governance 
under the altered context at the national level (1980). More 
recently, Milward and colleagues have pointed to some hypoth- 
esized consequences of contracting out and the "hollow state," 
particularly as regards a putative "leakage of accountability" 
(Milward 1996, 87; see also Milward, Provan, and Else 1993). 
4481J-PART, July 1997 
The Waldo Symposium 
The issue of accountability is surely a central one for those 
concerned with democracy and administration in settings rife with 
contracting, as many scholars have suggested (Moe and Gilmour 
1995). But since specialists in public law, contracts, and 
principal-agent relations are helping to highlight this challenge, 
the present analysis emphasizes other issues. The remainder of 
the discussion here entails a twofold analytical shift: from 
relatively simple dyadic ties based on contracts to thoroughly 
networked structures, and from accountability to-respectively- 
responsibility, responsiveness, and the fostering of deliberation, 
civility, and trust. 
Responsibility 
A person is responsible for an action if and only if that 
person brings the action about and has done so freely. Responsi- 
bility is necessarily a complex and problematic criterion in 
organizational settings because here both causation and volition 
are difficult or impossible to determine or individualize. Further- 
more, public administrators face responsibilities to follow an 
array of obligations, not merely the executing of commands hier- 
archically imposed (note, for instance, reference to professional 
responsibilities, as mentioned above). These multiple obligations 
may admit of no optimizing solution, even for the most diligent 
official. 
Still, the responsibility typically treated as primary is that 
toward the overhead democracy, as operationalized through the 
hierarchy. It can be argued, on the basis of both logic and evi- 
dence, that hierarchies encourage a dulling or depersonalizing of 
individuals' sense of responsibility for their own actions. There is 
a tendency for those populating large agencies, in other words, to 
develop a somewhat weakened or distanced sense of their causa- 
tion and volition. 
Several features of such organizations encourage a distanc- 
ing of individuals from a sense that they themselves are acting. 
Among the elements contributing to diffusion of responsibility are 
agency socialization, systems of authority, objectification of those 
being dealt with, and the seductive pull of free ridership in the 
large and often difficult-to-move administrative structure ("what 
can one person effectively do?"). All in all, organizations can be 
rather potent environments for the dulling of individually 
responsible action. 
This is not to say that individuals are automatons in bureau- 
cratic settings; numerous examples suggest that sometimes public 
administrators, acting in good conscience, seek to influence 
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results for the better, in defiance of self-interest or organizational 
pressures. Further, as Dwight Waldo has noted, it is simply not 
the case that individual defiance of organizational precedent or 
pressure is necessarily heroic or desirable, despite the heavy bias 
toward this portrayal in administrative fiction (Waldo 1968). But 
the reality of the Eichmann syndrome offers a sobering lesson to 
temper any uncritical faith in the power of hierarchy to ensure 
responsible action (Arendt 1963). 
What, then, of responsible public administrative action in 
networks? In this context there are both hazards and encourage- 
ments. Of particular concern can be the even broader scale of 
action, and congeries of actors, such that individual administra- 
tors may feel less capable of decisively influencing events. A 
conflicting sense of one's duties, as these are perceived by the 
boundary-spanning administrators in networks, may produce con- 
fusion and even an overall weakening of the sense of responsi- 
bility by someone who seeks to manage the cluster toward some 
outcome. This point, then, goes beyond the concerns raised in 
discussions about accountability (external, observable lines of 
reporting and control), and to the internal interpretations of one's 
obligations as framed in the mind of the administrator. 
On the other hand, network settings offer opportunities for 
administrators to consider their responsibilities in the democratic 
context. These opportunities tem in part from the weakening of 
certain of the forces mentioned above. 
The jargon and standard interpretations used within agencies 
are likely to be challenged or complexified in a network, as 
different actors and organizational understandings compete for 
the attention of administrators. Systems of authority are neces- 
sarily weaker as well. Frameworks for classification of cases and 
clients, along with other elements that contribute to reification, 
are likewise less powerful. The sense of free riding, or the 
feeling that one person is unlikely to be effective, either can be 
intensified or muted in networks vis-a-vis hierarchies, depending 
greatly on the structure of interdependence among the units and 
work processes involved. Some patterns can facilitate recognition 
of both causation and volition, thus enhancing individuals' sense 
of responsibility (O'Toole 1985). On the other hand, complex 
and reciprocally interdependent patterns of networked action can 
be prone to serious defections from responsible action. In such 
cases, individuals may not be able to ascertain the impact of their 
own effort, even if they exert a good-faith effort. Evidence on 
this proposition is sparse, although classic analyses like Martha 
Derthick's study of the dynamics of an intergovernmental grant 
program point to this result (1970, 214). 
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In general, then, if bureaucratic structures offer strong 
influences that encourage a distancing of individuals from the 
consequences of their choices, so too networked arrangements 
offer contexts in which both causality and volition can be per- 
ceived as so limited that responsibility seems to dissipate. The 
overall actions of the network may be almost impossible to 
follow, the task of giving the array a shove in any particular 
direction may seem unrealistic, and perceived responsibility goes 
the way of accountability: it disappears. Those who manage 
public affairs in networks can perform essential roles, but 
irresponsible action on their part can distort performance toward 
self-interested paths. 
Still, it is equally important o recognize the potential for 
public managers to enhance the sense of responsibility felt by 
network participants who execute public programs. The sheer 
variety of interests, routines, jargon, and perspectives in the 
network can break the monocratic view. So actors involved in 
networks may become more sensitive to the array of perspectives 
involved in implementation and to a richer set of stakeholders 
than is evident to those operating within "lonely organizations." 
Networks, then, provide some raw material for participants' 
magnified sense of responsibility. The extent to which this poten- 
tial is actualized depends on many factors. Some of these are in 
the hands of public administrators. By remaining conscious of the 
challenges to responsible conduct, administrators can help those 
involved to be aware of their special obligations. One can call 
these moral incentives, a somewhat oxymoronic term. Framing 
the issue more directly, one can say that administrators who 
operate in networks can enhance the sense of responsibility felt 
by others by pointing to causal paths and consequences (increas- 
ing individuals' sense of impact); helping to show actors that 
responsible options are available (augmenting the sense of voli- 
tion); and generally focusing participants' limited attention on 
their obligations toward truth telling, promise keeping, and the 
need to treat program needs and interests seriously. 
These are not merely theoretical possibilities. Empirical 
work by some public choice scholars, for instance, has demon- 
strated that self-organizing among actors of diverse interests can 
result in stable networked patterns that enhance social welfare, 
even in the absence of authoritative state decisions (Ostrom 1990; 
see also Bogason 1991). While the systematic avoidance in public 
choice research of the sometimes essential roles of authoritative 
actors and truly public administrators (as something more than 
rent seekers) is an important lacuna, such research has demon- 
strated that under some conditions leadership and (shall one call 
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it) civic discourse in thoroughly complex and decentral settings 
can leverage responsibility among diverse and differently 
endowed actors toward long-term cooperation. 
Responsiveness 
Administrative responsiveness is another criterion by which 
to assess how public administration fits with the requisites of 
democratic governance. How responsive are administrative 
arrangements likely to be in network contexts? The key issue 
would seem to be responsiveness to whom, or-somewhat more 
precisely-responsiveness to which portion of the broader public? 
Even in administrative settings as traditionally understood, 
students of pluralistic policy making long have documented 
patterns of bureaucratic units' responding to the pulling and 
hauling of stakeholders, and they have sketched different models 
to portray such patterns. It is a staple of American public 
administration that agencies' immediate environment exercises 
substantial pressure on bureaucratic behavior. Some portrayals of 
the dangers of such responsiveness point to the lack of broad 
representativeness within these clusters (Lowi 1979). Others, 
critiquing the caricatured view of closed and intensely self- 
interested alliances, assert that actual arrays are more open, 
diverse, and varied (Heclo 1978). In either case, the issue does 
not boil down to a lack of responsiveness by public administra- 
tion (despite recent rhetoric about enhancing responsiveness to 
customers), but rather different criteria regarding the appropriate 
reference groups. 
What of responsiveness in a more-networked world? First, it 
is clear that in at least some settings found in the United States 
today, the array of interests and perspectives involved is differen- 
tiated, is diverse, and has a complicated patterned (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993). Preliminary investigation of where and how 
decision makers such as administrators obtain cues to assist in 
their decision making indicates that the stereotypes of capture are 
not uniformly accurate. Ideas and information matter, and these 
are likely to be drawn from many sources in the administrative 
environment (see Sabatier 1996). 
Networks, therefore, may be settings in which a kind of 
responsiveness prevails or can be elicited, even in the face of 
complex pressures and a relative lack of clear accountability 
mechanisms. It is best, nonetheless, to keep in mind this ques- 
tion: Responsiveness to whom? Pluralist arrangements, embedded 
in networks, can at least accentuate responsiveness to intense or 
well-organized minorities at the expense of a more-diffuse 
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majority. Increased trends toward networking may mean that 
special efforts will have to be made-in formal policy or through 
the concerted efforts of public administrators-to incorporate 
within the network arrays some degree of broader representation. 
The foregoing discussion is particularly relevant to the 
American context. In other national settings, where for instance 
corporatist network arrangements prevail, a different set of 
considerations can apply. In Austria or the Scandinavian coun- 
tries, the degree of formal responsibility held by the bargaining 
participants means that corporatist arrays alter direction more 
slowly and, in a sense, are less responsive in the short run. Once 
an agreement has been reached, though, all partners are explicitly 
expected to help execute it. Widely recognized responsibility can 
be greater than in the United States, and responsiveness is also 
likely to be considerable over the long term. There may be some 
tradeoffs, then, between rapidity and breadth of response. 
How to arrange networks so they are responsive to the 
special needs and concerns of the interdependent partners and to 
public concerns, and how to structure networked institutional 
arrangements to capture high levels along both dimensions are 
challenges for the networked future of public administration. 
Structurally federated networks may be needed, and administra- 
tors could play an important role in crafting and maintaining 
these so as to encourage the right kinds of responsiveness to 
particular programs and issues. 
Despite the arguments of public choice advocates, there 
would seem to be important limits to citizens' ability to partici- 
pate effectively in the service-provision networks envisioned by 
some proponents. The presence of many complex constellations 
may intimidate individuals and inhibit deliberation. Administra- 
tors are likely to be limited in carving out public space and 
attention where many arrays operate simultaneously. Encouraging 
genuinely civic involvement in such settings is not likely to be an 
easy task. Some implications regarding deliberation and civic 
discourse, additional elements of the democratic ethos, are the 
subject of the next section. 
Deliberation, Civility, and Trust 
Democracy, in contemporary political science, often denotes 
causal linkage between the views of the people and the actions of 
government. Yet in this form the concept is rather limited. A 
fundamental component of enduring democratic systems is their 
capacity for reflective and deliberative civic discourse and 
engagement. And these requisites would seem to be essential for 
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the socialization of thoughtful citizens for the development of 
broad popular support for policy direction, and for the synthesis 
and development, not to mention critique, of innovative alterna- 
tives to the status quo. In the postmodern era, a time in which 
some might see the prospect of broadly public discourse as passe, 
democratic government continues to require a public sphere and 
its reflective colloquy. One of the most widely noted recent 
normative arguments on behalf of public administration in the 
United States, the so-called Blacksburg manifesto, called attention 
to this issue. In the Blacksburg argument the foundational 
element of legitimacy is the public organization, grounded in 
constitutional support and oriented around the "agency perspec- 
tive" as the locus of public-spirited ialogue (Wamsley et al. 
1990). In the present argument, meant to reframe some aspects of 
democratic theory in administratively networked contexts, the 
consideration of discourse and civility requires some reorien- 
tation. 
Dwight Waldo has emphasized the legacy of ancient Rome 
in contemporary American administrative thought and practice 
(1982). For purposes of a reflection on implications for civility 
and deliberation in the American setting, the present analysis 
draws from a somewhat different Italian ancestry. In the widely 
noted volume Making Democracy Work (1993), Robert Putnam 
interprets decades of research on Italian regional government and 
the contributions apparently made by civic ties, associations, and 
what Putnam calls networks. Putnam makes a strong case that the 
regional governmental institutions differ strikingly in perceived 
effectiveness and in many additional performance measures. 
The core of the theoretical argument, and the focus of some 
intriguing evidence, is the idea that the most important explana- 
tory force driving the large regional differences in governmental 
performance has been the quality and level of "horizontal" civic 
engagement in regional affairs by individuals and associations. 
The building of community, the involvement of disparate actors 
in public affairs and programs, and even the stimulation of 
involvement in associations with no apparent civic purpose-all 
these activities are highly intercorrelated with each other and 
with the degree of effectiveness of regional government. Put- 
nam's key explanatory variable is social capital, which in turn is 
elicited by networking. "Social capital here refers io features of 
social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions" (p. 167). Social capital, built on the basis of "vibrant 
networks," is the product of "civic community," a pattern "bound 
together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, 
not by vertical relations of authority and dependency" 
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(pp. 87-88). Putnam emphasizes social networking, especially 
among individuals via voluntary association, rather than cross- 
cutting institutional inks through functionally driven, sometimes 
contractual, ties. But his empirical analysis and theoretical 
discussion embrace such additional forms as well. There is no 
reason to expect his argument about the importance of horizontal 
ties not to extend to the kinds of networks discussed here. 
A particularly controversial part of Putnam's argument 
involves the claims that these relationships can be demonstrated 
and they are closely linked to levels of economic development. 
He further argues that civic community not only precedes but it 
helps to stimulate both market-based economic development and 
effective government: "This history suggests that both states and 
markets operate more efficiently in civic settings" (pp. 181). 
Furthermore, the evidence leads to the inference that the civic 
networks in Italy are neither quickly built nor rapidly dismantled. 
This claim-that horizontal networks are causally prior to, 
and more important han, economic forces in explaining regional 
differences-has been subject to critique. Indeed, serious 
methodological questions can be raised regarding some of 
Putnam's temporal inferences (see, for example, Tarrow 1996). 
There is no denying the centrality of the assertions, however. 
Despite the dispute surrounding elements of Putnam's analysis, 
certain implications stand out clearly. 
First, there is no reason to believe that higher levels of 
community and higher degrees of horizontal networking entail a 
sacrifice of the values most highly prized in liberal societies. In 
the Italian cases, at least, these attributes covary. Indeed, as 
Putnam observes, these cases offer support for the arguments of 
Piore and Sabel (1984) regarding "decentralized, but integrated 
districts . . . a seemingly contradictory combination of competi- 
tion and cooperation" (Putnam, p. 160). Of course external valid- 
ity constraints may be important here, particularly regarding 
inferences supportable in the highly individualistic United States. 
Nevertheless, the relationship documented by Putnam suggests, at 
the very least, that the strength and density of horizontal ties and 
the involvement of diverse associations in the public as well as 
the social life of a polity need not necessarily be seen as com- 
petitive with governmental authority, legitimacy, and perform- 
ance. Nor is networking a euphemism for forced, authoritarian 
rule. Stronger, denser, more vibrant horizontal networks may 
strengthen public institutions and public administrative capacity 
and also preserve or encourage values of liberalism and toler- 
ance. Leveraging horizontal ties, building on trust, and 
encouraging the development of cooperative norms also can 
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enhance administrative capacity, and governmental capacity more 
generally. 
In short, deliberation, civility, and trust-all key components 
of a democratic regime-have been found to be associated with 
horizontally networked settings; thus on the basis of these 
requisites of democratic governance, administration within an 
increasingly networked world may be firmly grounded in demo- 
cratic principles rather than threatened by competitive institu- 
tional links. 
Second, there are clearly additional implications for public 
administration; the precise lessons, nonetheless, depend partly on 
how much of Putnam's exposition is accepted. If it takes cen- 
turies to generate sustainable civic community, administrators 
cannot do much in the short term to enhance deliberation, trust, 
or effectiveness. Some critics of this perspective emphasize, 
however, that government itself may be able to play a more 
active role in catalyzing and facilitating the growth of horizontal 
ties and social capital, that opportunities for influence may be 
larger and more immediate than Putnam's sketch implies. 
The exceedingly long timeline emphasized by Putnam may 
not accurately represent the Italian situation, let alone a general 
social dynamic. As a matter of fact, Putnam himself has raised 
serious questions about such developmental dynamics in later 
arguments, claiming that American associational ties have experi- 
enced rapid declines in recent decades (Putnam 1995). If net- 
worked arrangements are capable of large shifts over relatively 
short periods, the implications are at least twofold: First, 
American administrators cannot take their network infrastructure 
for granted (and administrators in less-networked settings can 
avoid a counsel of despair); second, the actions of public admin- 
istration itself, along with the choices made by other social 
actors, can either enhance or deplete the networked context for 
civic community. 
In particular, public administrators can focus on ways to 
encourage network development and a proliferation of horizontal 
ties in program settings, in field contexts for agency operations, 
and among public agencies and governments whose cooperation 
is required for sustained performance. Actions aimed at trust 
generation, norm development, reciprocity, and other ways to 
increase the vibrancy of networks in settings for public programs 
may be not only possible but essential elements of public admin- 
istration (for a discussion of the fragility of trust in administrative 
settings, see La Porte and Metlay 1996). Administrators, far 
from being largely peripheral actors in democratic governance, 
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might perform instead essential functions in the fostering of 
social capital necessary for deliberation, trust, and civility. 
It need hardly be said in this context that not all network 
development constitutes a contribution to the infrastructure of 
democracy. Networks that represent the mere triumph of narrow 
special interest governance are obvious possibilities. Problems of 
accountability and representativeness often occur when adminis- 
trators are granted carte blanche for institutional design and 
management within networks. Since these issues have been more 
widely discussed than have the less obvious advantages for 
democracy of networked public action, it would seem useful to 
consider this additional side to the network coin. 
In any event, public administrators may do well to be alert 
to the importance of networks for concerting and achieving 
public action and to look for opportunities to facilitate, even in a 
modest way, the development of the kinds of networks that can 
help administrative ffectiveness over the long run. For instance, 
administrators can try to ride the waves of-and help perpetuate 
and encourage-virtuous cycles of action, in which the building 
of trust among network participants can have a self-fueling and 
self-fulfilling character. Networks clearly cannot be developed or 
sustained merely through short-run or episodic efforts, or from 
only one position in a complex institutional setting. But admin- 
istrators can probably make a difference if they enhance effective 
network development and thus foster some of the attractive 
features of deliberative democratic governance. 
This discussion can be interpreted as a network version of 
the Blacksburg agency-level argument for the importance of 
administrative institutions as a locus for the ongoing search for 
the public interest and the development of a public-centered 
dialogue. The presence of networks is no guarantee against 
parochialism; indeed, complex interorganizational rrangements 
may incubate such perspectives unless there are concerted efforts 
to enhance balance and openness in the institutional setting. 
Public administrators may be well positioned to help facilitate the 
horizontal development of network arrays while they also 
encourage within these arrays a public-interested character. 
CONCLUSION 
As Dwight Waldo has suggested, specialists cannot pretend 
that the obligations of democratic governance are external to the 
sphere of public administration. The task of seeking an appro- 
priate reconciliation of administration with democracy requires an 
analysis of contemporary institutions of administration to 
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ascertain the extent to which these, and the administrators who 
lead them, can contribute to the achievement of democratic 
governance. 
As complex interorganizational rrays have assumed prom- 
inence as settings for the execution of public policy, some classic 
normative questions must be considered anew. Does networked 
public administration pose a threat to democratic governance or 
offer the prospect of its more complete attainment? To the extent 
that this issue has been considered heretofore, the question has 
typically been framed in terms of accountability; on this score it 
is clear that complex arrays proffer challenges that are not easily 
managed or minimized. Nonetheless, considering the query along 
some additional dimensions-responsibility, responsiveness, and 
the development of deliberative trust in a polity-suggests a more 
complex assessment. Administration in networks, it would seem, 
provides both complications and opportunities to facilitate parts 
of the democratic ideal. 
If the argument regarding the increasing importance of net- 
works for administration has merit, scholars and practitioners 
need to consider in detail the empirical and normative implica- 
tions of these complex institutional forms. In particular, a 
commitment to democracy accompanying a recognition of the 
significance of networks suggests that some classic issues of 
democratic theory (in terms of forms of overhead control) and 
the traditional way of framing issues of administration (in terms 
of bureaucratic structure and process) may have to be reformu- 
lated. If administrators have to join rather than beat or ignore the 
network club, and if they are to assist rather than subvert the 
democratic ideal, renewed attention must be directed to the long- 
standing themes of democracy and administration-themes that 
have long formed a core of Dwight Waldo's inspiring vision. 
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